N.E.wguy
Product of my environment
Acknowledgments
All coauthors of the article have extensive contemporary battlefield experience and mutually participated in the conceptualization, development, and implementation of the joint theater trauma system.
Discussion
Dr. Donald D. Trunkey (Portland, Oregon): I think this article is very encouraging, because I think there has been a major change since Desert Storm. I believe, though, there are still some unsolved problems. I would like to have your comments. Has the military looked at how effective the civilian trauma training is for those who are in the active military?
My sense is it has been very positive. However, there may be another problem. At least a majority of the surgeons and anesthesiologists that come into the military from the reserve are not getting the same type of training, and their skills may not be equal to what you’re being able to maintain in the active duty.
This becomes a further problem if you look at the other needs within the United States. Not only do we have to provide training for the reserves but then we have the DMAT (Disaster Medical Assistance Teams) and we have Homeland Security needs.
It seems to me that if we had the vision, we could put together a system that integrates all of these needs. I think we should have a pool of highly trained surgeons, anesthesiologists, and nurses who could solve all of these needs. By increasing by one-third the manpower in Level I trauma centers, we would create a “reserve pool.”
Who pays for this? Well, I would argue that the military is already wasting some money with STRAP programs in order to attract people into the military. If you pooled these dollars and you got Health and Human Services and Homeland Security to put in some dollars, we could then have this reserve pool. It would be very similar to what the airline pilots do. They can get called back into active duty at any time. The airlines cooperate with this program. Similarly, if you had surgeons and anesthesiologists and nurses working in civilian trauma centers, you could pull out maybe up to a third at any given time to solve some of these needs.
The other thing that I identified, at least after Desert Storm, is that in military hospitals, critical care was being done by nonsurgeons. Maybe that’s the model we should adopt; I, personally, don’t think so, but I’d like your opinion about that, as well.
I was very encouraged by some of the things that you’re doing from a system standpoint, and it is so logical to use the American College of Surgeons system’s approach in the military.
Finally, I’m going to ask you a question you won’t probably want to answer, but is this now the time that we should reconsider the purple suit? It seems to me the Surgeons General are now cooperating, and should we have a pool of surgeons who belong to really no branch but could be dispatched or placed anywhere in the world and fulfill what the military sees as their role.
Dr. Donald Jenkins (San Antonio, Texas): I think that the judgment would be that the civilian trauma center experience has been effective. Certainly, the opinion polls taken of those surgeons who have been through that site, the nurses and the medics, have gained tremendous amounts of hands-on experience they didn’t otherwise get the opportunity to have.
They felt much more confident. I think that there is some clinical success that you see there in the first engagements that we have data for. As far as critical care, that’s what we see as being the difference. I wasn’t in Vietnam, but I judge that the ward that we have in that field hospital doesn’t look a lot different. The difference in lives saved, I think, is over in the critical care end of that.
What can’t be overlooked is the Air Force role in critical care air transport, where you could take a fellow with a damage control operation, triple amputation arriving with a blood pressure of 60, have a lifesaving damage control operation, three times in less than 40 hours: once in Iraq, once in Germany, and once in Walter Reed, and that kid then, 6 months later, is getting married, and walking without assistance on his prostheses. It is a tremendous success story.
So, I think critical care is definitely the way to go. As far as the purple suit idea goes, that would sort of be a Department of Defense level question that you know I’m not going to answer. But I will tell you this, I worked side-by-side with my Army colleagues at this hospital. That team up there was made of Australian neurosurgeons and Air Force general surgeons and Army nurses and British nurses, and we were about as close to a purple suit operation, I think, as you can get there in some of those facilities. So, I think there is merit to that, Sir.
Dr. Sheldon Brotman (Pittsfield, Massachusetts): You say that you have a PI program. I’d like to know how you’re closing loops. Let’s say you’ve got a triage problem with a certain unit. How do you get back to these people and how are you able to effectively monitor your problems?
Dr. Donald Jenkins (San Antonio, Texas): That is a 24/7 endeavor. We have one trauma nurse at each one of those Level III facilities. Their responsibility is to provide feedback down to those Level II institutions, as well as forward to the Level IV institutions.
We just held, for the first time, a three-continent performance improvement conference out of Iraq last week via the telephone with folks in San Antonio, folks in Germany, folks in Washington, DC, and folks down in Iraq, all on the phone together talking about some of those patients. So, it’s old fashioned hard work, stubby pencil, see the problem, come up with a solution set for that problem, call those folks forward. It’s done on a regular basis. Lowell Chambers, down at Level II, I think, would be the first to say that it’s in evolution, but it does work. Captain DeNobile (USN) and Colonel Flaherty are in Iraq actually working on this today.
Dr. David G. Burris (Bethesda, Maryland): For Don Trunkey’s question, it was very interesting a year and a half ago, when a Tri-Service trauma surgeon group sat down and said, “What we need in theater is this kind of a guy” (a Theater Trauma Consultant). For that group to suggest that a “blue guy” (Air Force) suddenly go into a “green slot” (Army) in theater to make this happen shows that we are functioning as a purple suit, but maybe are not wearing a purple suit.
Don, some people ask me, “What does purple suit mean?” So, if you would define that, and second, you mentioned the levels of care, and you mentioned “The Gold Book.” Please discuss that a little bit because there is not a one-to-one correlation between Gold Book levels of care and military levels of care. I think that might be confusing for people, so I appreciate your discussion of that.
Dr. Donald Jenkins (San Antonio, Texas): The purple suit idea is that instead of each of the services having their own medical corps (with the Navy serving not only the Navy but also the Marine Corps), you had one medical service that was joint, you could tap into that pool and they would go to any kind of engagement regardless of the troops that would be involved. I’m currently wearing pretty close to a purple suit. I’ve got this little Army medical department badge up here that was put on me by the Army Surgeon General; I speak a lot of Army now.
To answer the Army levels of care question, those ordinals are inverse from what we would consider in the United States. A Level I trauma center in the United States is a Level V facility for the U.S. military. That’s the burn center in San Antonio or Walter Reed Army Medical Center. These Level III facilities that we’re talking about are more robust than Level III facilities, I think, that you would find here in the U.S. system of things. It’s somewhere between a II and a III with, again, 6 or 8 operating beds, 40 to 100 ward beds, half a dozen to 25 ICU beds at those places, with all the surgical capabilities.
Dr. Gregory Beilman (Minneapolis, Minnesota): Just a quick question. I noticed in my experience there that 70% to 80% of the patients we’re caring for are Iraqis, Iraqi soldiers, MOI, and so on. How are you tracking outcomes with those patients compared to our soldiers?
Dr. Donald Jenkins (San Antonio, Texas): Yes, the local Iraqi population is a difficult endeavor to track down those outcomes. Things change over time, and we had the great luxury of being able to keep our patients for as long as they needed to be kept and see them back in follow-up.
Some of that is changing today, so it does represent a significant challenge for us. If those patients are transferred out of that hospital today, you lose that follow-up on those individuals. The JTTR has the charts and will be entering the data of these Iraqi patients. Across the theater, 60% or more of all admitted casualties are non-U.S. casualties; these patients will all eventually be captured in the JTTR.
Dr. Erwin F. Hirsch (Boston, Massachusetts): After the debriefings that occurred in the aftermath of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, many questioned the ability of the Armed Forces to prepare its Medical Services in the care of combat casualties. I stand here to congratulate the authors of this article plus everybody else involved since the beginning of this operation, not only for the excellence in patient care, but in addition for the development of this system, which we in the civilian community should look at very seriously. I think very soon the paradigm that the civilians are training the military is going to change and that military lessons learned will apply to the care of nonmilitary patients.
All coauthors of the article have extensive contemporary battlefield experience and mutually participated in the conceptualization, development, and implementation of the joint theater trauma system.
Discussion
Dr. Donald D. Trunkey (Portland, Oregon): I think this article is very encouraging, because I think there has been a major change since Desert Storm. I believe, though, there are still some unsolved problems. I would like to have your comments. Has the military looked at how effective the civilian trauma training is for those who are in the active military?
My sense is it has been very positive. However, there may be another problem. At least a majority of the surgeons and anesthesiologists that come into the military from the reserve are not getting the same type of training, and their skills may not be equal to what you’re being able to maintain in the active duty.
This becomes a further problem if you look at the other needs within the United States. Not only do we have to provide training for the reserves but then we have the DMAT (Disaster Medical Assistance Teams) and we have Homeland Security needs.
It seems to me that if we had the vision, we could put together a system that integrates all of these needs. I think we should have a pool of highly trained surgeons, anesthesiologists, and nurses who could solve all of these needs. By increasing by one-third the manpower in Level I trauma centers, we would create a “reserve pool.”
Who pays for this? Well, I would argue that the military is already wasting some money with STRAP programs in order to attract people into the military. If you pooled these dollars and you got Health and Human Services and Homeland Security to put in some dollars, we could then have this reserve pool. It would be very similar to what the airline pilots do. They can get called back into active duty at any time. The airlines cooperate with this program. Similarly, if you had surgeons and anesthesiologists and nurses working in civilian trauma centers, you could pull out maybe up to a third at any given time to solve some of these needs.
The other thing that I identified, at least after Desert Storm, is that in military hospitals, critical care was being done by nonsurgeons. Maybe that’s the model we should adopt; I, personally, don’t think so, but I’d like your opinion about that, as well.
I was very encouraged by some of the things that you’re doing from a system standpoint, and it is so logical to use the American College of Surgeons system’s approach in the military.
Finally, I’m going to ask you a question you won’t probably want to answer, but is this now the time that we should reconsider the purple suit? It seems to me the Surgeons General are now cooperating, and should we have a pool of surgeons who belong to really no branch but could be dispatched or placed anywhere in the world and fulfill what the military sees as their role.
Dr. Donald Jenkins (San Antonio, Texas): I think that the judgment would be that the civilian trauma center experience has been effective. Certainly, the opinion polls taken of those surgeons who have been through that site, the nurses and the medics, have gained tremendous amounts of hands-on experience they didn’t otherwise get the opportunity to have.
They felt much more confident. I think that there is some clinical success that you see there in the first engagements that we have data for. As far as critical care, that’s what we see as being the difference. I wasn’t in Vietnam, but I judge that the ward that we have in that field hospital doesn’t look a lot different. The difference in lives saved, I think, is over in the critical care end of that.
What can’t be overlooked is the Air Force role in critical care air transport, where you could take a fellow with a damage control operation, triple amputation arriving with a blood pressure of 60, have a lifesaving damage control operation, three times in less than 40 hours: once in Iraq, once in Germany, and once in Walter Reed, and that kid then, 6 months later, is getting married, and walking without assistance on his prostheses. It is a tremendous success story.
So, I think critical care is definitely the way to go. As far as the purple suit idea goes, that would sort of be a Department of Defense level question that you know I’m not going to answer. But I will tell you this, I worked side-by-side with my Army colleagues at this hospital. That team up there was made of Australian neurosurgeons and Air Force general surgeons and Army nurses and British nurses, and we were about as close to a purple suit operation, I think, as you can get there in some of those facilities. So, I think there is merit to that, Sir.
Dr. Sheldon Brotman (Pittsfield, Massachusetts): You say that you have a PI program. I’d like to know how you’re closing loops. Let’s say you’ve got a triage problem with a certain unit. How do you get back to these people and how are you able to effectively monitor your problems?
Dr. Donald Jenkins (San Antonio, Texas): That is a 24/7 endeavor. We have one trauma nurse at each one of those Level III facilities. Their responsibility is to provide feedback down to those Level II institutions, as well as forward to the Level IV institutions.
We just held, for the first time, a three-continent performance improvement conference out of Iraq last week via the telephone with folks in San Antonio, folks in Germany, folks in Washington, DC, and folks down in Iraq, all on the phone together talking about some of those patients. So, it’s old fashioned hard work, stubby pencil, see the problem, come up with a solution set for that problem, call those folks forward. It’s done on a regular basis. Lowell Chambers, down at Level II, I think, would be the first to say that it’s in evolution, but it does work. Captain DeNobile (USN) and Colonel Flaherty are in Iraq actually working on this today.
Dr. David G. Burris (Bethesda, Maryland): For Don Trunkey’s question, it was very interesting a year and a half ago, when a Tri-Service trauma surgeon group sat down and said, “What we need in theater is this kind of a guy” (a Theater Trauma Consultant). For that group to suggest that a “blue guy” (Air Force) suddenly go into a “green slot” (Army) in theater to make this happen shows that we are functioning as a purple suit, but maybe are not wearing a purple suit.
Don, some people ask me, “What does purple suit mean?” So, if you would define that, and second, you mentioned the levels of care, and you mentioned “The Gold Book.” Please discuss that a little bit because there is not a one-to-one correlation between Gold Book levels of care and military levels of care. I think that might be confusing for people, so I appreciate your discussion of that.
Dr. Donald Jenkins (San Antonio, Texas): The purple suit idea is that instead of each of the services having their own medical corps (with the Navy serving not only the Navy but also the Marine Corps), you had one medical service that was joint, you could tap into that pool and they would go to any kind of engagement regardless of the troops that would be involved. I’m currently wearing pretty close to a purple suit. I’ve got this little Army medical department badge up here that was put on me by the Army Surgeon General; I speak a lot of Army now.
To answer the Army levels of care question, those ordinals are inverse from what we would consider in the United States. A Level I trauma center in the United States is a Level V facility for the U.S. military. That’s the burn center in San Antonio or Walter Reed Army Medical Center. These Level III facilities that we’re talking about are more robust than Level III facilities, I think, that you would find here in the U.S. system of things. It’s somewhere between a II and a III with, again, 6 or 8 operating beds, 40 to 100 ward beds, half a dozen to 25 ICU beds at those places, with all the surgical capabilities.
Dr. Gregory Beilman (Minneapolis, Minnesota): Just a quick question. I noticed in my experience there that 70% to 80% of the patients we’re caring for are Iraqis, Iraqi soldiers, MOI, and so on. How are you tracking outcomes with those patients compared to our soldiers?
Dr. Donald Jenkins (San Antonio, Texas): Yes, the local Iraqi population is a difficult endeavor to track down those outcomes. Things change over time, and we had the great luxury of being able to keep our patients for as long as they needed to be kept and see them back in follow-up.
Some of that is changing today, so it does represent a significant challenge for us. If those patients are transferred out of that hospital today, you lose that follow-up on those individuals. The JTTR has the charts and will be entering the data of these Iraqi patients. Across the theater, 60% or more of all admitted casualties are non-U.S. casualties; these patients will all eventually be captured in the JTTR.
Dr. Erwin F. Hirsch (Boston, Massachusetts): After the debriefings that occurred in the aftermath of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, many questioned the ability of the Armed Forces to prepare its Medical Services in the care of combat casualties. I stand here to congratulate the authors of this article plus everybody else involved since the beginning of this operation, not only for the excellence in patient care, but in addition for the development of this system, which we in the civilian community should look at very seriously. I think very soon the paradigm that the civilians are training the military is going to change and that military lessons learned will apply to the care of nonmilitary patients.